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Publications (33)

Trans-national externalities are increasingly important in the globalized economy, being related to knowledge, information, migrations, pollution, crime and similar flows. Their importance and close link to economic development may affect growth and welfare at a macroeconomic level: hence the need for global policies to correct their undesired effects. In the present institutional setting -with no supranational governing bodies -global externalities cannot be corrected by global institutions,which do not exist, but need to be corrected by voluntary agreements among sovereign States. This situation gives rise to several difficulties and sub-optimal outcomes. This paper reviews some recent advances in this area, with special reference to coalition formation theory. In particular it discusses mechanisms and strategies aimed at offsetting the incentives to free-ride and/or exclude countries for international agreements, such as transfers, issue linkages, and treatise design. The main results show that, in the presence of global externalities, partial coalitions and multiple agreements tend to prevail among subsets of countries, and that agreements among all players are unlikely to exist. The design of the agreements, however, can be crucial in determining the number of signatory countries and in promoting the creation of global institutions.
This book provides a systematic account of the privatization process at the global scale, presenting an overarching description of the phenomenon, and panel data empirical analyses testing some of the predictions of the recent economic theory of privatization. At the macroeconomic level, privatization processes of the 1980s and 1990s are shown to be a cyclical phenomenon shaped by economic, political, and institutional determinants. At the microeconomic level, privatization has been partial and incomplete, with only minority rights transferred to the private sector. However, genuine privatization, involving the full transfer of control to the private sector, is difficult to achieve as several conditions must be met. First, markets should be competitive or suitably regulated. Second, private investors should be adequately protected by the law in order to avoid expropriation. Third, political institutions should be designed to limit the veto power of constituencies ousting full divestiture. Last but not least, governments should be credibly committed not to interfere post-privatization in the operating activity of the companies. As a consequence, private ownership is likely to coexist with public control, at least in the near future. © Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) 2004. All rights reserved.
This volume provides a broad survey of the recent developments in the new economics of the environment and reports the state of the art on a new set of environmental problems, analytical tools and economic policies. Throughout the volume environmental problems are analyzed in an open, generally noncompetitive economy with transnational or global externalities. The first part deals with the relationship between the environment, economic growth and technological innovation. The second part analyzes the optimal design of environmental taxation, while the third part considers the international dimension of environmental policy.
Why do countries privatise? This paper presents new evidence from a panel of 34 countries over the 1977–1999 period. The empirical analysis shows that privatisation takes place typically in wealthy democracies, encumbered by high public debt, but endowed with deep and liquid stock markets. Budget and ‘market’ constraints matter, but legal institutions are also important. Indeed, the extent of privatisation in terms of revenues and stakes sold appears more limited in civil law countries, where shareholders are poorly protected, banks powerful, and capital markets less developed.
The scientific and policy worlds have different goals, which can lead to different standards for what constitutes "proof" of a change or phenomena, and different approaches for characterizing and conveying uncertainty and risk. These differences can compromise effective communication among scientists, policymakers, and the public, and constrain the types of socially compelling questions scientists are willing to address. In this paper, we review a set of approaches for dealing with uncertainty, and illustrate some of the errors that arise when science and policy fail to coordinate correctly. We offer a set of recommendations, including restructuring of science curricula and establishment of science-policy forums populated by leaders in both arenas, and specifically constituted to address problems of uncertainty.
This paper deals with Science and Technology in research policy. Following recent literature on the economics of knowledge, Science and Technology are defined as distinct institutional arrangements, broadly corresponding to nonmarket and market allocation mechanisms. Previous analyses argued that Science and Technology can and should coexist within an economic system or society. This paper shows that Science and Technology tend to coexist- and should coexist on welfare grounds-also within the same research field, and even when researchers are perfectly identical. Our analysis was inspired by the race to sequence the human genome, but the proposed theoretical framework can also be used to assess the recent evolution of other research fields, e.g., research on GMOs. The paper also provides guidelines for policies designed to achieve the optimal size of public research within a given research field. (JEL: D78, H4, H23, O32, O38) Copyright (c) 2003 The European Economic Association.
This Paper elaborates on the recent race to sequence the human genome. Starting from the debate arising from the genome case on public versus private research, the Paper shows that in some fundamental research areas, where knowledge externalities play an important role, market and non-market allocation mechanisms do coexist and should coexist in order to ensure socially desirable achievements. A game-theoretic model makes it possible to demonstrate the above results and to characterize some features of an optimal research policy.
This paper presents evidence on privatisation processes in 49 countries for the period 1977–1996. The empirical analysis shows that the decision to privatise and the choice of privatisation method appear to be influenced by the governing political majority and public-sector budget constraints, while the success of privatisation in terms of revenues and stakes sold requires suitable legal institutions and developed capital markets.
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Up Shoe Net Grey DC Black Lace Men This paper elaborates on the recent race to sequence the human genome. Starting from the debate on public vs. private research arising from the genome case, the paper shows that in some fundamental research areas, where knowledge externalities play an important role, market and non-market allocation mechanisms do coexist and should coexist in order to ensure socially desirable achievements. A game-theoretic model makes it possible to demonstrate the above results and to characterise some features of an optimal research policy.
This paper presents new evidence about privatisation processes and their determinants from a panel of 34 countries over the 1977-99 period. The empirical analysis shows that privatisation takes place typically in wealthy and democratic countries, endowed with deep and liquid stock markets, and is affected by the governing political majority and public sector budget constraints. But the extent of privatisation in terms of revenues and stakes sold appears more limited in civil law countries, where shareholders are poorly protected, banks powerful, and capital markets less developed.
Privatisation, i.e. the transfer of ownership and control of state-owned enterprises, is a worldwide phenomenon. Which political, economic and institutional factors are shaping this process? This paper addresses the issue presenting new evidence from a sample of 49 countries. From an empirical analysis of the period 1977-96, the decision to privatise and the choice of privatisation method appear to be influenced by the governing political majority and public sector budget constraints, while the success of privatisation in terms of revenues and stakes sold requires suitable institutions and developed capital markets.
This paper investigates the companies' behavioural response to information-based environmental policies. We perform a panel analysis for 39 big companies in 16 countries, in 3 polluting industries (oil & gas, chemicals, power generation) over a 5- year period (1993-1997) to check whether environmental policies (command and control and energy taxation) and the adoption of information-based environmental strategies affect the companies' economic and environmental performance. The results confirm the positive role of self-regulated environmental audits and compensation programmes on corpo rate environmental performance.
This Policy Forum is based on the report of a 2-day meeting held on the island of Askö in the Stockholm archipelago in September 1997. The meeting was convened by the Beijer International Institute of Ecological Economics of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Stockholm. Its aim was to encourage a substantive dialogue among a group of natural and social scientists so as to assess whether an interdisciplinary consensus exists on the issue of food production, population growth, and environmental security.
International environmental agreements are increasingly important in a globalised economy. Beyond their specific interest, these agreements are also important in the context of coalition formation theory. Given the incentives to free ride, associated to the environment as a public good and to the presence of spillovers, the profitability and the optimality of environmental agreements are separated from their stability (i.e. self-enforcement): hence, a whole set of political economy issues. This paper reviews the recent advances in this area. In particular, it discusses mechanisms and strategies aimed at offsetting the incentives to free ride and increasing welfare, such as transfers, issue linkages, threats and multiple agreements. The main results show that partial coalitions and multiple agreements tend to prevail among subsets of players, and that agreements among all players are most unlikely to exist. The design of the agreements, moreover, can be crucial in determining the number of signatory countries.
There are two broad criteria by which one can judge humanity's success in feeding itself: (i) the proportion of people whose access to basic nutritional requirements is secure; and (ii) the extent to which global food production is sustainable. Even though the two are related, they have usually been discussed separately in popular writings. This has had unfortunate consequences. Writings on (ii) have often encouraged readers to adopt an all-or-nothing position (viz. the future will be either rosy or catastrophic), and this has drawn attention away from the economic misery that is endemic in large parts of the world today. On the other hand, writings on (i) have frequently yielded no more than the catechism that the nearly 1 billion people in poor countries who go to bed hungry each night do so because they are extremely poor. In short, if (ii) has focused on aggregate food production and its prospects for the future, (i) in contrast has isolated food-distribution failure as a cause of world hunger. In this article we will adopt the view that (i) and (ii) should not be studied separately, that their link can be understood if attention is paid to the dynamic interactions between ecological and economic systems operating primarily at the geographically localised level.
International environmental agreements are increasingly important in a globalised economy. Beyond their specific interest, these agreements are also important in the context of coalition formation theory. Given the incentives to free ride, associated to the environment as a public good and to the presence of spillovers, the profitability and the optimality of environmental agreements are separated from their stability (i.e. self-enforcement): hence, a whole set of political economy issues. This paper reviews the recent advances in this area. In particular, it discusses mechanisms and strategies aimed at offsetting the incentives to free ride and increasing welfare, such as transfers, issue linkages, threats and multiple agreements. The main results show that partial coalitions and multiple agreements tend to prevail among subsets of players, and that agreements among all players are most unlikely to exist. The design of the agreements, moreover, can be crucial in determining the number of signatory countries.
Is knowledge an economic good? Which are the characteristics of the institutions regulating the production, the transfer and the difffusion of knowledge? This volume adopts a multidisciplinary approach to bring knowledge at the forefront, as a key economic issue.
Is knowledge an economic good? Which are the characteristics of the institutions regulating the production and diffusion of knowledge? Cumulation of knowledge is a key determinant of economic growth, but only recently knowledge has moved to the core of economic analysis. Recent literature also gives profound insights into events like scientific progress, artistic and craft development which have been rarely addressed as socio-economic institutions, being the domain of sociologists and historians rather than economists. This volume adopts a multidisciplinary approach to bring knowledge in the focus of attention, as a key economic issue.
This paper investigates institutions for the creation and transmission of knowledge as efficient resource allocation mechanisms. By looking at Science and Technology it develops a two-way classification. Science is a non-market allocation mechanism, where knowledge is treated as a pure public good and where the rule of priority provides an incentive scheme for disclosure. Technology is a market allocation mechanism, where knowledge is treated as a private good and where patents and copyrights preserve property rights. The distinction between these two entities is based on the institutional arrangements involving the allocation of resources for enquiry, not on the differences in the objects and methods of inquiry. The paper compares the rule of priority and patenting as alternative incentive schemes. It also discusses whether it is optimal for society to preserve two different institutions, partly rival and partly complementary, and examines the major policy implications.
The European Union faces several interlinked challenges: how to protect the environment and favour sustainability; how to reduce unemployment and foster competitiveness in a context of growing globalization; how to reduce regional disparities among and within me mb er countries. The recent policy debate has clarified that the above objectives are not a trade off if jointly tackled. In particular, win-win policy options are available to the European Union by an appropriate integration of regulation, macro­ policy, social policy, fiscal policy and environmental policy. Evidence shows that optimising on each single policy will not meet the needs of the European Union. On the contrary, an integrated approach will make it possible to reach the various objectives, as stated in the Treaty on European Union, in the 5th Environmental Action Programme, in the White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment. This integrated approach would im­ plement a genuine sustainable development policy.
International agreements to protect the global environment are typically difficult to reach. In principle they should be profitable for all players involved in the negotiation. Even when they are profitable, however, they are often unstable due to the incentive to free-ride (enjoying the clean environment provided by others' emission reduction without paying the cost). One possible way to overcome this problem is to link the unstable environmental agreement to other agreements which are profitable and stable. This paper presents a model where an environmental negotiation, which is profitable but unstable, is `stabilized' by linking it to an agreement on R&D cooperation, which is shown to be profitable and stable. The optimality of this linkage is also discussed.
Over the last twenty years, scientists have stressed the importance of some new phenomena related to the use of the environment: climate change, ozone-layer depletion, acid depositions, freshwater pollution, marine pollution, deforestation and the loss of biological diversity (e.g. Cf. UNEP, 1991; World Bank, 1992; Worldwatch, 1994). Many of these problems have been recently discovered (e.g. the ozone-layer depletion); some have recently acquired importance due to their scale and potential impact (e.g. climate change, deforestation, or water pollution).
This paper provides a general framework for studying the profitability and stability of international agreements to protect the environment in the presence of trans-frontier or global pollution. N countries are assumed to bargain on emission control. Each country decides whether or not to coordinate its strategy with other countries. A coalition is formed when both profitability and stability (no free riding) conditions are satisfied. The analysis shows that such coalitions exist but that only a small number of countries decide to cooperate. The paper thus explores the possibility of expanding such coalitions through transfers that induce other countries to cooperate. It is shown that large stable coalitions exist when low environmental interdependence exists and/or when the environmental damage functions are near-separable with respect to domestic and imported emissions. It is also shown that there are cases in which environmental negotiations can achieve substantial emission control even if countries behave non-cooperatively.
The 1980s have seen an unprecedented growth in awareness of the problem of (man-induced) climate change. Scientific studies to assess the extent to which emissions resulting from human activities are increasing the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases (GHGs: carbon dioxide, methane, man-made chloro-fluorocarbons, nitrous oxide), thus contributing to raise the global mean temperature, have been carried out since the beginning of the decade.
We consider one polluting industry in an open economy. The national government implements a policy of industrial pollution control, by inducing appropriate technological innovation to reduce toxic emissions. The emission-reducing innovations are developed through firm-specific costly investments. Under different hypotheses on market structure (perfect competition, Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly), international competition forces the national government to subsidize innovation. The appropriate subsidy scheme varies according to the information available to the government and according to market structure. If information is asymmetric, the subsidy must include the information premium necessary to separate different types of firms. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1992
Il tema corporate governance è oggi molto rilevante per il nostro paese per almeno due motivi: in primo luogo, i nostri mercati finanziari, che si sono molto sviluppati nell'arco degli ultimi dieci anni, stanno esprimendo una forte domanda di governance all'interno delle imprese quotate; in secondo luogo, la corporate governance è fondamentale per le società privatizzate, che sono state uno degli elementi chiave dello sviluppo, e che stanno vivendo una difficile fase di transizione dallo Stato al mercato. Non è questa la sede per discettare sulle possibili definizioni di corporate governance. A noi basta dire che per "corporate governance" intendiamo quel complesso insieme di meccanismi istituzionali e di mercato che consente a chi offre capitale di ottenere un rendimento dal proprio investimento. Rimandiamo alle rassegne di Shleifer e Vishny (1997) e Tirole (2001) il lettore che voglia approfondire il tema. In questo lavoro, ci concentriamo soprattutto sulla tutela legale delle minoranze azionarie come obiettivo qualificante della governance delle imprese. La legge e la sua applicazione limitano i rischi di abusi da parte degli azionisti di controllo a scapito degli azionisti di minoranza. (Si noti che i piccoli azionisti non sono "vecchiette", ma azionisti non di controllo, quali ad esempio il Tesoro in Telecom Italia o gli investitori istituzionali.) Se la legge offre una buona protezione ai piccoli azionisti, teoricamente si innesca un circolo virtuoso che facilita il finanziamento attraverso il capitale di rischio, e la creazione di valore per l'azionista. Può sembrare banale, ma è questo uno dei meccanismi alla base dello sviluppo dei mercati finanziari, e della crescita delle imprese, altrimenti forzate a fare ricorso a risorse interne e/o al credito bancario. E' per questo che la tutela degli azionisti di minoranza – e quindi la corporate governance -è un problema di efficienza, non di equità. Essi vanno tutelati non perché lo Stato deve garantire pari diritti alle diverse categorie di azionisti, ma perché la loro tutela è rilevante per lo sviluppo armonico del mercato finanziario, elemento di efficienza e di crescita del sistema economico nel suo complesso.

Citations (27)

... In fact, we found cases in which the terms were used interchangeably, as synonyms, and cases in 34 which they had contrasting meanings. 35 In the mid-1990s, the incipient literature on sustainable development and technological change started to use 36 specific terms such as eco-innovation and environmental innovation to refer explicitly to the innovations 37 aiming at reducing environmental impacts, in the attempt of operationalizing the sustainable development 38 premises ( Carraro and Siniscalco, 1992;Fussler and James, 1996;Green et al., 1994;A. B. Jaffe and Palmer, 1 1997;Johansson and Magnusson, 1998;Lanjouw and Mody, 1996;Pickman, 1998). ...
... Bolourian et al. (2009) study the behaviour of people in social networks and the dynamics of information diffusion in the Blogosphere which can help social networking sites to capitalize on their audience. There are also a few examples of percolation based research into knowledge sharing and knowledge networks (see Grebel, 2005; Navaretti et al., 2013; Popescul, 2012). However, in these articles, the theory of percolation as such is not applied, only the concept of percolation is used to mean 'connectedness'. ...
... According to Vest (2010), the population of the larger Tucson Metropolitan Area (Pima County) is predicted to triple by 2040. It is well-documented that growing populations have impacts on all aspects of the natural world ( Daily et al., 1998; Ehrlich, 1968). Nie et al. (2010) demonstrate a relationship between the urban growth between 1992 and 2001, in which the increase in developed area of 45.3%, impacted local hydrology in the Santa Cruz Watershed by decreasing average evapotranspiration (ET) by 0.29% and increasing surface runoff by 6.7% and water yield by 5.1%. ...
... The empirical evidence on privatisation methods appears to be mixed. While Megginson et al. (2004) report that privatisation through private sales is more likely when the investor protection is better (common law countries), Bortolotti et al. (2000) report a higher frequency of private sales in civil law countries. Likewise, Dyck and Zingales (2004) examine the effects of private benefits of control on the development of markets, particularly on the ownership structure of firms and the choice of privatisation methods. ...
... They are directly used in production processes and protected by patents. This can be seen as a formalization of ideas that have been developed for years by various authors such as Arrow (1962), Scotchmer (1991), Dasgupta et al. (1996), Gallini and Scotchmer (2003) but which have not found their way in growth models. ...
... A fifth reason why climate policy is more complicated than needed is that it has been used to promote other agendas. Greenhouse gas emission reduction is a global public good (Hoel 1991 , Carraro and Siniscalco 1992, Barrett 1990, van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw 1992, Battaglini and Harstad 2015, Stavins 2011). The costs of emission abatement are borne by the country that reduces the emissions. ...
... However, this free-riding result is explained by countries'political cost of deviating from the content of the treaty. 4 This literature was complemented by other class of models in which countries were assumed to exhibit a preference for " international equality " , Lange and Vogt (2003) and Hoel and Schneider (1997), by introducing the possibility that international negotiations impose sanctions on " defecting " countries, Barret (1992 Barret ( , 1994a), or to link the negotiations of transboundary pollution with other issues such as free-trade agreements, Carraro and Siniscalco (2001), Whalley (1991) and Folmer et al (1993). 5 Chayes and Chayes (1995) also recognize that noncompliance exists, but they explain it by relying on uncontrollable social or economic changes a¤ecting the signatory country. ...
... In addition, our analysis stresses that free riding also bites not only at the extensive margin, when determining the incentives to ratify an agreement, but also at the intensive margin for ratifiers. Relying instead on tools from noncooperative game theory, other authors ( Carraro and Siniscalco 1993;Barrett 1994; Carraro and Siniscalco 1995;Finus 2002Finus , 2008) impose external and internal stability criteria to study the formation of coalitions. Subsequent research ( Carraro 2005) has stressed the importance of various institutional rules in ensuring participation and stability, and solving the free rider problem. ...
... The adoption of more innovative activities or tools, which is often correlated to EMS adoption, can be interpreted as an evidence of planning capabilities and, consequently as a way to strengthen the effectiveness of an EMS. For instance, in a study on Italian facilities between the years 1994 and 1997, evidence emerged that with the implementation of specific environmental management tools such as compensation schemes and award schemes, SO x and NO x pollution rates strongly improved [15]. In similar studies, Arimura et al. [9] and Annandale et al. [16] demonstrated the positive effect of the publication of environmental reports on environmental performance at firm level. ...
... A large literature looks at the average performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private companies and finds that the former underperform the latter in most cases (for a review see Bortolotti, Fantini, & Siniscalco, 2004; Bortolotti, 2004; Megginson, 2005; Megginson & Netter, 2001). In general, the conclusion of this vast literature is that SOEs are relatively inefficient compared to private companies and, therefore, governments would be better of privatizing these firms (or most of them). 1 Yet, governments face complex political economy environments that complicate the process of privatization or prefer not to privatize certain firms for strategic (or ideological) reasons. ...
... The case study under examination regards a single tax, therefore a 2D matrix can be developed; this approach can be extended further by overlaying different 2D-GT matrices of various environmental taxes to generate a 3D-GTMatrix able to compare the relevance of various tax revenue uses of different environmental tax options. Much of discussion of revenue spending in the literature [15], [3] concerns the reduction of labour taxes, leaving global tax pressure unchanged, and earmarking is often criticised. The proposed instrument is intended to quantitatively compare all different options. ...
... Sovereign countries decide upon the management of the international global and regional commons and the forms and extent of international cooperation is determined by the preferences for environmental quality in different countries, the costs of pollution control and the possibility of free-riding (Mäler, 1989; Carraro and Siniscalco, 1991; Hoel, 1991 Hoel, , 1992 Barrett, 1994). Free-riding can be a rational choice, when countries have the possibility to benefit from increased pollution control in other countries without undertaking any pollution reduction themselves. ...
... In den meisten Studien wird Privatisierung entweder schlicht über die Inzidenz einer Privatisierung (gelegentlich begrenzt auf einen bestimmten Sektor), über die Höhe der Privatisierungserlöse oder über die Veränderung des Staatsanteils gemessen (z. B. Boix 1997; Bortolotti und Siniscalco, 2004;Belke et al. 2007;Zohlnhöfer et al. 2008;Schneider und Häge 2008). Diese Indikatoren haben allerdings erkennbare Nachteile. ...
Reference: Wirtschaftspolitik
... Meanwhile, at the (sub-)national and global scale (beyond the scope of this review), the contributions of forest ecosystem services include protection of watersheds, carbon sequestration and climate regulation (Daily and Matson 2008) and the evaluation of such services are much more challenging (de Groot et al. 2010). With reference to Daily et al. (1998), Shibu (2009) and Vihervaara et al. (2010), we attempted a classification of forest ecosystem services by spatial scale. The classification (seeTable 1) helps to identify local and regional ecosystems services provided by forests and trees that are considered relevant to the scope of this systematic review. ...
... Section 4 explores the effects of a CU with standards and Section 5 examines the stability of an MTA with standards. Section 6 5 Our study relates to the literature on international environmental agreements (IEAs) but most of them could not examine the case of local negative externalities and assume no international trade (e.g., Barrett 1994;Hoel 1992; Carraro and Siniscalco 1998), which implies that countries interact with each other only through global negative externalities. 6 See the European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/european-standards ...
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... However, the present model doesn't study the monetary incentives of labs to convince researchers to work for them. The stability of each team is given by the conditions of the standard coalition formation theory (d'Aspremont et al., 1983; Carraro and Siniscalco, 2003). Let us refer to a 'Research Cluster' (or RC) as a set of public and private research organizations within close proximity to one another which practice cooperation. ...
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... Stephan et al. (2002) claim that there are very good reasons to believe that applied and basic research can be reciprocally supported. Carraro et al. (2001) andFransman (2001) assert that some scientific discoveries derive from intense interactions between basic and applied research (science and technology) and it would be impossible to achieve them otherwise. Calderini and Franzoni (2004) study rivalry issues (over a three-year period) on a panel of 1,323 Italian researchers operating in the field of engineering and materials science, results. ...
... The international requirement for an unremitting reduction in automobile body weight is sought to pacify the calls for increased fuel efficiency. The need for body design optimisation (requiring minimum weight) has therefore been driven by the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Regulations [1] of North America and by a proposed European Carbon Tax [2]. Traditionally, weight reduction in a vehicle's structure has been achieved by: having a reduction in material thickness, using lightweight materials, introducing innovative hybrid structures, or a combination of these. ...
... The motivation of this alternative instrument is the following. First, right-wing governments prefer that local firms remain owned by domestic investors (Serdar Dinc and Erel 2013), and at the same time favor promarket policies, so fostering the development of local financial markets ( Bortolotti, Fantini, and Siniscalco 2004). Second, we use the percentage of cabinet posts of right-wing political parties and not only a dummy left/right to control for the country-level political uncertainty. ...
... Moreover, while decision makers subject to this binding agreement may cooperate on certain issues, these same players may act non-cooperatively when interacting with all other players along other dimensions. Examples where these tools are applicable range from areas as diverse as environmental agreements ( Barree 1990, Carraro and Siniscalco 1993), R&D collaborations ( Yi andShin 2000, Banal-Espã nol et al. 2013), and nancial alliances between banks ( White 1996, Popov and Ongena 2011, In 't Veld and van Lelyveld 2014. ...
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